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Lockean Freedom and the Proviso’s Appeal to Scientific Knowledge 
 
1. Introduction 
 
At the heart of any libertarian theory of justice lies its conception of how 
we appropriate rightful private property. And part of what makes the 
Lockean position so attractive is its proposal that the enough-and-as-
good proviso—hereafter simply the proviso—successfully identifies each 
person’s original fair share of the earth’s material resources. By applying 
the proviso, each person, on her own, can determine her fair share of the 
natural resources. In this paper, I argue that Locke and contemporary 
Lockeans underestimate the problems involved in their frequent and im-
plicit assumption that when we apply the proviso we use the latest scien-
tific knowledge, whether of natural resources, technology, or the opera-
tions of the economy. Problematic for these theories is that so much of 
the pertinent knowledge used is obtained through some particular per-
son’s labor. If what is obtained through an individual’s labor must be 
made available to everyone, and if any particular person’s new knowl-
edge affects the application of the proviso, then it seems that some will 
find themselves without freedom to pursue their own ends and others 
will find their freedom subject to the arbitrary will of others. Therefore, 
any interpretation of the proviso that employs the assumption of the lat-
est scientific knowledge undermines the Lockean aim of arriving at a 
conception of freedom understood as the free interaction of equals sub-
ject to laws rather than to each other’s arbitrary will. 
 Not recognizing the problems associated with assuming the latest sci-
entific knowledge in the application of the proviso in Locke’s own theory, 
many contemporary Lockean theories take this assumption on as their 
own when they attempt to revise the proviso in order to solve Locke’s 
difficulty with original acquisition in conditions of scarcity. Indeed, they 
even exacerbate the problems by giving the need for the latest scientific 
knowledge a more central role to play. After providing an analysis of 
these issues as they appear in Locke’s own theory, I address them as they 
also appear in the work of four prominent Lockeans: Robert Nozick, Mi-
chael Otsuka, A. John Simmons, and Gopal Sreenivasan. In the final sec-
tions of the paper, I try, albeit unsuccessfully, to overcome some of the 
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difficulty surrounding the need for scientific knowledge. The recalci-
trance of the problems identified, however, leads me to conclude that 
finding solutions is essential to a Lockean conception of private property 
consistent with Lockean freedom. 
 
 
2. Locke’s Proviso 
 
Locke’s proviso concerns rightful relations between employable persons 
in their original acquisition of private property. The aim is to give an ac-
count of how unilateral acquisition of private property can be seen as acts 
of lawful freedom, understood as actions within the constraints of the 
laws of nature (II: 22, cf. I: 101).1 To be free is to act in accordance with 
the laws of nature, which in turn provide each person with a sphere in 
which he can set and pursue his own ends (II: 6, cf. II: 25, 56-59, 63). 
Ideally speaking, the state of nature is  
 
a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions … within the bounds of the Law of Nature, 
without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of 
Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than 
another … [and no] Subordination or Subjection (II: 4, cf. II: 3, 6 f., 54 f., 61, 87, I: 67). 
 
In the ideal version of the state of nature, people interact within the laws 
of nature in a condition of perfect freedom and equality devoid of subjec-
tion to each other’s wills. It is a condition in which a person’s natural 
power to set and pursue her own ends with her means is reciprocally re-
stricted by the laws of nature rather than arbitrarily by other persons. 
And since, as Locke thinks, it is in principle possible for a virtuous per-
son correctly to specify, apply, and enforce the laws of nature in her in-
teractions with others, each person has a so-called “natural executive 
right,” meaning a natural right to enforce the laws of nature when inter-
acting with others (II: 6-9, 13). 
 Locke wants to give an account of private property appropriation that 
is consistent with this conception of freedom under laws, since only 
through private property do we have the means necessary to exercise our 
freedom. Locke aims to identify ideal restrictions upon private property 
appropriation that are consistent with both his conception of freedom 
under laws and each person’s natural executive right. The restrictions on 
original property appropriation must therefore be determinable and en-
forceable by any person without thereby undermining anyone else’s 
freedom. Determining such restrictions, however, gives rise to a puzzle 
                                                 
 1Citations to Locke’s Two Treatises of Government use the notation “I: 101” or “II: 
22,” e.g., to refer to the treatise and paragraph number. John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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for Locke, namely, how to reconcile two reasonable yet apparently in-
compatible claims concerning property. First, Locke argues, all land is 
originally owned in common, and second, an individual must be able 
rightfully to appropriate private property from the common land without 
consent from the other commoners (II: 25). How is unilateral private ap-
propriation of any piece of property possible without thereby depriving 
others of their common land? 
 Locke’s suggested solution to the puzzle is that by laboring on the 
commons, a person obtains a fixed property right in the appropriated re-
sources given that he appropriates subject to certain restrictions. And the 
restriction we are concerned with here, the proviso,2 states that appro-
priation of natural resources is rightful (or gives rise to private property) 
at least if a person leaves “enough and as good” of the natural resources 
behind for others: 
 
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands … are properly his. Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his 
Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. 
It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. For this Labour 
being the unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what 
that is once joyned to, at least where there is enough, and as good left in common for others 
… The labour that was mine, removing them [the natural resources] out of that common 
state they were in, hath fixed my Property in them (II: 27-28, cf. II: 25-35, 40-46, 50).3 
 
Locke argues that to respect the proviso is to make sure that one interacts 
with others in a way that respects each able-bodied person’s right to pri-
vate property and to self-preservation through labor, and hence, does no 
“prejudice to any other Man” (II: 33, cf. II: 34, 36). By laboring on the 
land and leaving at least “enough and as good” behind, a person obtains 
“fixed” property in the natural resources, and others have an obligation to 
respect the rightfulness of his appropriation.4 Therefore, no able-bodied 
person can deprive another of resources appropriated according to the 
                                                 
 2The other restrictions upon private property, namely, the waste restriction, the charity 
restriction, and the restriction governing the parental relation, are not relevant to the discus-
sion in this paper. Also note that for the purposes of this paper, we do not need to go into all 
the interpretative puzzles concerning Locke’s presentation of the labor argument. My aim is 
to avoid these textual controversies, since they are not important to the argument here. 
 3With the invention of money, this picture becomes more complicated, since consent-
ing to the use of money is seen as implying consent to unequal possessions (II: 47-50). 
To engage the scholarship on this issue, though, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 4One may read Locke as arguing not that everyone becomes obliged here, but that 
one does not wrong anyone if one uses coercion to protect the fair share of natural re-
sources as determined by the proviso. Since the interpretation above is the more standard 
one and since this exegetical issue is inconsequential for the argument in this paper, I do 
not pursue this issue here. 
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proviso without also wronging him, for that would be to deprive him of 
his labor.  
 
2.a. Problems concerning the application of Locke’s proviso  
 
On Locke’s account, a person labors subject to the proviso when she 
originally appropriates something from the commons. As long as the per-
son at least leaves enough and as good of the natural resources behind, 
she has an enforceable right to the natural resources appropriated and to 
the values subsequently created by means of her labor. In this section, I 
will argue that because Locke implicitly assumes the latest scientific 
knowledge when applying the proviso, his argument encounters three 
problems: (1) it is irreconcilable with each person’s equality, namely, the 
equal right to the fruits of one’s labor; (2) it involves a rejection of each 
person’s freedom, or right to choose which ends to pursue with her 
means; and (3) it gives particular individuals the right to change the way 
in which the proviso should be applied in particular circumstances, 
which is subjection to some particular person’s will rather than to law. 
All of these problems illustrate a common problem: Locke does not have 
a conception of the application of the proviso that is consistent with his 
conception of equality and freedom under laws of nature rather than sub-
jection to some particular person’s will (cf. II: 4 above). 
 First, why can’t Locke reconcile his implicit appeals to scientific 
knowledge with his defense of each person’s equal right to the fruits of 
her labor? According to the proviso, our original appropriation is justi-
fied at least if we leave “enough and as good” behind of the natural re-
sources for others. The problem arises because this conception of the 
proviso pays insufficient attention to the way in which knowledge deter-
mines what counts empirically as a natural resource. Consider Locke’s 
own example, albeit from a different context, of the way in which the 
discovery of iron changed what were thought to be natural resources.5 
Prior to our knowledge of iron, mountains were not seen as natural re-
sources with respect to iron. But after the discovery, those mountains 
with iron became very valuable. The general point is that new scientific 
discoveries change the empirical question of what we are taking and 
what we are leaving behind, and so they also change the correct applica-
tion of the proviso. To make sure that all appropriations are consistent 
with the changes in what constitute natural resources, it appears neces-
sary to argue that Locke’s proviso requires us to ensure that each scien-
tific discovery is reflected in the application of the proviso. Therefore, 
                                                 
 5See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. 
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), book IV, chap. XII, §§10-11.  
 Lockean Freedom 5 
 
 
 
from the point in time of the discovery of a new natural resource, there 
would be required new determinations of what satisfies the enough-and-
as-good restriction as well as readjustments of earlier appropriations in 
light of the new discovery. In short, the application of the proviso must 
accommodate the way in which scientific discoveries change not only the 
nature of current and future rightful appropriations, but also the rightful-
ness of all past appropriations.6 
 To make such an accommodation, Locke’s account must explain how 
everyone either has or can acquire the required knowledge. Locke ap-
pears simply to assume that everyone already has it or at least has access 
to it at all times. But this assumption appears unjustifiable on his view, 
since the knowledge resulting from any scientific discovery presumably 
belongs to the person—say, the scientist—who discovered it. Since her 
knowledge is a result of her labor on her fair share of the natural resources, 
no one else can be seen as automatically having a right to it. Having such a 
right would be to have a right to the fruits of the scientist’s labor. Thus, 
simply assuming the latest scientific knowledge when applying the pro-
viso has the consequence that the conception of the proviso is inconsis-
tent with protecting persons’ “fixed” property in the values they create 
by means of labor on their fair share of the natural resources.7 
 Second, the appeal to knowledge when applying the proviso results in 
some individuals not having the right to do as they wish with their 
means, which is inconsistent with their right to freedom under laws. 
Those whose discoveries affect the application of the proviso would be 
required not only to instigate a redistribution of property, at least insofar 
as their new knowledge affects their own shares, but also they would be 
required to share their knowledge with others in order to bring about re-
assessments of fair shares and possible redistributions of what were once 
thought rightful original acquisitions. It makes little difference whether the 
burden is the weak requirement merely to make their knowledge available 
to others, or a stronger requirement to actually educate them. Regardless, 
an interpretation of the proviso that includes the knowledge assumption 
requires that those with knowledge must do something, namely, set ends, 
such that others have access to what they know. But then these specific 
individuals are no longer seen as having a right to choose which ends to set 
with their means, for their knowledge and labor must now be put toward 
meeting the particular end of making it possible for others to apply the 
                                                 
 6Naturally, if we assume that the proviso does not regulate appropriations of the past 
in light of new scientific knowledge, then this latter point does not apply. I consider such 
a present-and-forward-looking conception of the proviso later in the paper. 
 7One alternative is to argue that we cannot be seen as having the right to the scien-
tist’s knowledge, though we must allow for our initial fair share to be adjusted in light of 
this knowledge. I return to this objection in the final sections of the paper.  
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proviso. This problem has the strange implication that an individual can-
not set an end to increase his knowledge of the world without thereby 
running the risk of undermining his own private property rights.   
 Third, the appeal to scientific knowledge to satisfy the proviso allows 
that those with knowledge are in a position arbitrarily to change the way 
in which the proviso is applied. By choosing one particular research pro-
gram over another, a scientist can unilaterally and by mere choice (or 
“will”) begin a process that might very well undermine the rightfulness 
of all current appropriations of various natural resources and land. For 
example, assume that before oil was discovered beneath the land, a par-
ticular geologist very interested in that possibility decides to do some 
research. After some time, she discovers huge oil deposits on some par-
ticular farmers’ land. The proviso now appears to entail that due to the 
geologist’s discovery, there must start a process leading to the reshuf-
fling of land to give everyone, including herself, a fair share of the oil. In 
more sinister scenarios, the geologist may indeed have some foreshadow-
ing of the possible consequences of her research, and thus solely on her 
own prerogative decide not to pursue it with regard to some parcels of 
land rather than others, say, those belonging to her friends and family. 
Because the scientist’s knowledge provides her with such a favored posi-
tion with regard to the application of the proviso, the rightfulness of 
other people’s private property appears subjected to her will, rather than 
to laws that restrict everyone equally.8 
                                                 
 8It is worth emphasizing that this is not merely an instance of the unobjectionable 
way in which people’s choices affect how the laws of nature apply in particular circum-
stances. For example, if I choose to appropriate a particular piece of land, then this par-
ticular piece of land becomes unavailable to others. There are two differences between 
such a case and the case of the geologist. First, by means of her labor on her rightful 
share of resources, the geologist undermines another person’s already appropriated piece 
of land. Second, the geologist is not merely applying the proviso (as in the case of merely 
appropriating and thus making a parcel of land unavailable to others), but by means of 
her labor on her fair share of the natural resources she is changing the way in which every-
one must apply it. In addition, an anonymous referee has objected that this third argument 
is merely an instance of a more general problem. Because a person’s physical and mental 
resources determine how useful objects are to her, someone with more resources would 
have the upper hand with regard to application. She can choose whether or not to make 
her strength and wit available to others and hence change both which things are useful to 
others and what must be left behind when they appropriate. The more general problem, so 
the objection goes, is that one person can determine the application of the proviso by 
choosing whether or not to withhold knowledge or other resources. I disagree with this 
objection. In my view, the general problem is the one I have identified, namely, that by 
choosing to labor on her own fair share of the natural resources one person can arbitrarily 
determine how the proviso must be applied by everyone. The reason is not that she 
chooses to share any of her resources with others, since this in principle cannot affect the 
correct application of the proviso. Rather, the reason is that her labor changes the “objec-
tive” nature of the answer to the question: what is the fair share of the natural resources? 
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 Finally, note that what is common to all three problems is that they 
undermine Locke’s aim of giving an account of freedom in which we, as 
equals, can set and pursue our own ends constrained only by the laws of 
nature. This is precisely what the proviso, a principle intended to restrict 
everyone reciprocally, is supposed to ensure. But as we have seen, by 
making the latest scientific knowledge a prerequisite for the proper ap-
plication of the proviso, the proviso becomes unable to do its work as a 
lawful restriction on individuals’ original acquisition of property. The 
proviso does not protect everyone’s equal right to the fruits of one’s la-
bor, it does not protect everyone’s freedom to set and pursue one’s own 
ends with one’s means, and finally, its actual application can be arbitrar-
ily affected by the will of some particular individuals. Therefore, Locke’s 
theory of justice, with this theory of property as an essential component, 
has a significant internal tension.  
 
 
3. Contemporary Lockean Conceptions of the Proviso 
 
The above difficulties also characterize contemporary Lockean theories, 
because they assume that the appeal to the latest scientific knowledge 
when applying the proviso is unproblematic. In fact, it seems fair to ar-
gue that contemporary theories actually exacerbate the problems outlined 
above due to their increased emphasis and reliance on scientific knowl-
edge to help Locke’s proviso deal with issues of scarcity. To illustrate, 
let’s take a look at four prominent, yet importantly different, contempo-
rary Lockean theories. 
 
3.a. Robert Nozick’s account of the proviso 
 
A primary aim of Nozick’s Anarchy, State and Utopia9 is to overcome a 
problem concerning the operations of the proviso under conditions of 
                                                                                                             
Her labor changes what constitutes a natural resource in the first place. This is why, in the 
bulk of the paper, I assume that scientists are not permitted to withhold their new knowl-
edge; their knowledge is required in order to know what the fair share of resources for eve-
ryone is. In my example, the scientist’s choice is whether or not to pursue knowledge—not 
whether or not to share it once obtained. Consequently, the general problem I have identi-
fied cannot be an instance of the general problem identified in the objection. (In response to 
the contemporary Lockean positions I discuss below, I also argue that if one’s account of 
the proviso makes people dependent upon systems in order to acquire their fair share of the 
resources, then those in charge of the systems cannot withhold their knowledge of them. I 
agree with the referee that how to deal with personal differences regarding physical and 
mental capacities presents a special challenge to Lockeans, and to address this challenge I 
argue below that my account is successful also against Otsuka.) 
 9Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974). All 
parenthetical page references in this section of the paper refer to this work. 
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scarcity of natural resources. As Nozick understands it, “[t]he crucial 
point [of Locke’s proviso] is whether appropriation of an unowned object 
worsens the situation of others” (175). He then argues (the famous “zip-
back” argument) that Locke’s proviso is inconsistent with rightful, origi-
nal acquisition in times of scarcity (176). As scarcity arises, the new-
comer cannot appropriate a fair share, which entails that the person be-
fore him cannot have left enough and as good behind of the natural re-
sources, and so on. This argument “zips back” because it applies to, and 
therefore undermines, all previous appropriations under conditions of 
scarcity (175 f.). Nozick’s proffered solution is to soften the proviso 
while at the same time maintaining its central commitment that original 
appropriation must not leave others in a worsened condition. He suggests 
that a person may appropriate under conditions of scarcity if he compen-
sates newcomers: “Someone whose appropriation otherwise would vio-
late the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others 
so that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compen-
sate these others, his appropriation will violate the proviso … and will be 
an illegitimate one” (178). Compensation, Nozick suggests, can consist 
in either access to use the landowners’ land or access to use or acquire 
some of the social product that landowners have produced upon their 
land.10 Moreover, Nozick argues that because the capitalist system pro-
duces a large social product, and because its markets give newcomers 
access to this social product through the market system, landowners’ 
original appropriation of all the land is redeemed. Therefore, even though 
newcomers cannot appropriate land, because of the capitalist system they 
are not seen as left in a worsened condition. 
 Nozick emphasizes that in order to justify the claim that newcomers 
are not left “worse off,” we must first settle what it means to be worse 
off. There needs to be established an “appropriate base line for compari-
son. Lockean appropriation makes people no worse off than they would 
be how?” (177). Unfortunately, Nozick does not fully answer this ques-
tion,11 but in true Nozickean fashion, he does go on to say something 
about how we should calculate such a baseline. He suggests that were it 
possible to calculate the correct value of raw materials and the values 
created on the basis of the raw materials, then we could establish a base-
                                                 
 10Gopal Sreenivasan argues that Nozick’s proviso captures Locke’s actual conception 
of the proviso, since access to land or social product produced upon the land is also 
Locke’s solution to problems arising with high levels of scarcity. See Gopal Sreenivasan, 
The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 54. 
Because Nozick argues that his version of the proviso is (merely) “similar to the weaker 
of the ones we have attributed to Locke” (178, my emphasis), Nozick seems to believe he 
is offering a different proviso from Locke’s own. 
 11As often is the case, Nozick simply says that the issue “needs more detailed investi-
gation than we are able to give it here” (177). 
 Lockean Freedom 9 
 
 
 
line for comparing whether or not persons are left worse off or better off 
with or without a capitalist system (ibid.). It is here that Nozick encoun-
ters the problems I have identified in Locke’s proviso. 
 Nozick’s utilization of the capitalist system to ameliorate the condi-
tions of newcomers actually worsens the problems related to the need for 
the latest scientific knowledge when applying the proviso. He not only 
reproduces, but actually exacerbates, the first problem by implicitly giv-
ing scientific knowledge even more work to do in his theory. Special 
knowledge of the past and current value of the natural resources is neces-
sary to calculate the baseline for determining whether or not someone is 
left in a worsened condition. Nozick relies on both correct historical 
knowledge of natural resources in addition to knowledge about the “so-
cial product” made available in markets to serve as compensation for new-
comers. Yet in order to calculate the correct compensation, each person 
needs the most updated knowledge with regard to various social products 
and their values as determined by the markets. But then it seems that per-
sons must have a right to the latest scientific knowledge of others in either 
the weaker (access to information) or stronger (right to be educated) sense. 
But as we have seen, such a right to the labor of another is irreconcilable 
with everyone having an equal right to the fruits of her own labor.  
 Nozick’s position also reproduces the second problem. Those with 
knowledge, and only those, are required to pursue certain ends, since the 
pursuit of these ends is deemed required by the proviso. The knowledge-
able are required to begin a reshuffling process and also to make their 
knowledge available to others in the stronger or weaker sense. Finally, 
Nozick’s position encounters the third problem of subjecting all those 
without the pertinent knowledge to the will of those who have or who 
can easily obtain such knowledge. Again, the problem seems to be that 
those with knowledge are in a position arbitrarily to utilize what they 
know to undermine the rightfulness of current private property holdings. 
For example, depending on what kind of knowledge they already have, 
they may choose to pursue research concerning existing or new discover-
ies of raw materials, or they may opt for research programs that will lead 
to changes in the production, supply, and relative value of various social 
products. Therefore, those with the requisite knowledge and research 
capabilities will be able to determine how the proviso is applied in par-
ticular circumstances, since by having such knowledge they can affect 
what the particular circumstances are. In this way, they can subject oth-
ers to their arbitrary choices with regard to how the proviso actually re-
stricts current private property appropriations. That is to say, those who 
have such knowledge can by mere choice “unzip” the rightfulness of ex-
isting private property relations. Rather than being reciprocally restricted 
by the proviso as a “side constraint”—Nozick’s term for a restriction 
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consistent with freedom under the laws of nature—some people will 
have their freedom subjected to the will of others, namely, those in pow-
erful positions with regard to knowledge.  
 
3.b. A. John Simmons’s account of the proviso 
 
Despite the fact that Nozick and Simmons belong to the right-wing and 
the left-wing strands (respectively) of the Lockean libertarian tradition, 
they agree on the essential assumption that the proviso does not give  
everyone a right to land. Their essential difference, as we will see 
shortly, is that Simmons’s proviso requires much more equality with re-
gard to material resources than does Nozick’s. Nevertheless, Simmons’s 
proviso is even more reliant on the latest scientific discoveries than 
Nozick’s, and consequently his position is more susceptible to the prob-
lem of ensuring free interaction as equals under laws rather than as sub-
ject to any particular person’s will. 
 Simmons describes the situation in the state of nature prior to any pri-
vate property appropriation as a “divisible positive community,” mean-
ing that all persons are seen as originally having an enforceable right to 
appropriate a fair share of the world’s resources, though not any particu-
lar share (238, 281, 291 f.).12 Although Simmons shares Locke’s “labour 
intuition,” he sees labor not as a substance that one mixes with unowned 
goods, but rather as a purposive, intentional activity aimed at satisfying 
one’s basic needs and obtaining some conveniences. The former he re-
fers to as “self-preservation” and the latter as “self-governance” (272-
75). Therefore, labor is seen as giving rise to an original, natural, and 
enforceable right to particular goods, because it is necessary to secure 
our rights to self-preservation and self-governance (224 f., 236 f., 242). 
Simmons emphasizes that he wants to capture the “widespread or endur-
ing intuition about property rights … that labor in creating or improving 
a thing gives one special claim to it … [so that] it would be wrong for 
others to take it away” (223, cf. 318 ff.). 
 Though Simmons agrees with Nozick that labor subject to the proviso 
yields only a “use right” to resources under conditions of scarcity, he 
goes farther by arguing that labor subject to the proviso must give rise to 
exclusive use rights or “exclusive property rights” in the “particular 
products” of one’s labor (230 f., 248, 275). Use rights, argues Simmons, 
are sufficient for self-preservation, but not for self-governance, for a per-
son cannot use her means to set and pursue her own ends (self-
governance) if her use of these means is subject to the choices of others 
                                                 
 12A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1992). All parenthetical page references in this section of the paper refer to this 
work. 
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(275 f.).13 Only the exclusive right to the fruits of our labor gives us in-
dependence from one another, since exclusivity gives us a right to “non-
interference” with respect to the goods we have created with our fair 
share of resources (261 ff.). 
 How does Simmons deal with the problem of scarcity? Conditions of 
scarcity are seen as arising when it is no longer possible to leave behind 
enough and as good of the same kind of material. Under conditions of 
scarcity, the proviso is met if and only if newcomers can obtain 
 
the opportunity of a living—a condition of nondependence, in which one is free to better 
oneself, govern one’s own existence … This requirement is … consistent with one’s be-
ing unable to appropriate [land and natural resources]. But it … requires not only an un-
reduced level of material well-being, but independence and opportunity … Each appro-
priation must simply leave enough and as good of the relevant goods in common for oth-
ers, if there is no alternative way to secure the rights of others to self-preservation and 
self-government. The only relevant baseline is the condition of others prior to the appro-
priation. Appropriation must initially leave others with no less opportunity to exercise 
their rights (to a fair share) than they had before the appropriation took place (293 f., cf. 
291 f., 298). 
 
Under conditions of scarcity, then, those who have appropriated must 
provide newcomers with alternative ways to acquire the same level of 
material well-being and conditions of self-government as those who en-
gaged in original appropriation enjoyed. Hence, Simmons has an answer 
to Nozick’s “zip-back” problem. Unfortunately, Simmons does not tell 
us how we should calculate exactly what the proviso requires. Indeed, he 
believes that these practical problems of calculation may be “enormous, 
if not insuperable” (295). Nevertheless, Simmons maintains that his in-
terpretation of the proviso results in “a theoretically clear (or clarifiable) 
limit on natural property rights, an objective measure of lawful accumu-
lation” (294 f.), which is an amount that “preserves for each an opportu-
nity for independence and self-government, not just self-preservation” 
(291, cf. 225, 284, 291-93). Simmons emphasizes that the proviso must 
operate similarly after the introduction of money (293 f., cf. 302-6). 
Therefore, the best Lockean position will not permit large, material (in-
cluding monetary) inequalities insofar as these are incompatible with 
everyone obtaining reasonable opportunities for self-preservation and 
self-government (306, cf. 314-19, 321). 
 I believe that despite the great ingenuity and appeal of Simmons’s 
position, he cannot avoid, and even suffers from more acutely than 
Nozick, the problems involved with an implicit need for the latest scien-
tific knowledge in the correct application of the proviso. Simmons’s reli-
                                                 
 13Since I am here only interested in engaging Simmons’s theory, it is unnecessary to 
establish which interpretation, if either (Nozick’s or Simmons’s), actually captures 
Locke’s own conception. 
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ance on employment opportunities in the economy (especially a mone-
tary economy) to secure independence (self-preservation and self-
government) makes his theory particularly vulnerable to the three 
charges leveled against Locke and Nozick. The reason is that so much 
knowledge is required. Employers and employees must know exactly 
what and how much they should exchange in order to fulfill the require-
ment of the proviso, namely, the guarantee of self-preservation and self-
governance though labor. In addition, Simmons’s proviso presupposes 
extensive knowledge of what constitutes a decent subsistence level of 
natural resources, including which particular material goods are required 
for subsistence. Moreover, it seems we would need considerable knowl-
edge in order to pass judgment on what kind of life is “meaningful” or 
considered by particular people to be “worth living”—that is, with suffi-
cient conveniences to enable self-governance. Finally, we would need a 
fairly extensive knowledge of markets and the fluctuating values of par-
ticular goods. Only such knowledge ensures that one’s private property is 
reconcilable with everyone else’s rights to self-preservation and self-
governance. Furthermore, the theory calls for considerable knowledge 
concerning what work abilities are required to be fully independent in 
particular economic systems. As Simmons admits, calculations of this 
sort are “enormous, if not insuperable.” But unlike Simmons, I believe 
that this is more than just a practical problem, since the proviso, in prin-
ciple, presupposes that everyone at least has access to the relevant (latest) 
scientific knowledge. But as we have already seen, having access to the 
latest and evolving scientific knowledge built into the application of the 
proviso is in tension with central tenets of any Lockean theory.  
 The first problem, as we find it in Simmons’s theory, is that those 
with knowledge are not secured an “exclusive” right to the fruits of their 
labor upon their fair share of resources. They must share their scientific 
discoveries and knowledge with others if interaction as subject to the 
proviso is to be possible. The second problem is that those with the perti-
nent knowledge are not given the right to set and pursue their own ends, 
which is necessary for “self-governance.” For example, as the calcula-
tions satisfying the requirements of the proviso change with variances in 
economic conditions, those with the appropriate knowledge must initiate 
reshuffling processes and either satisfy the weak requirement by making 
their knowledge available to others or satisfy the strong requirement to 
actually educate them. Indeed, since the calculations are “enormous” and 
even perhaps “insuperable,” and since the data used in these calculations 
presumably change nearly continuously as the markets fluctuate, or as 
new scientific discoveries are made, it seems fair to say that these redis-
tribution and information/education projects would be ongoing. The third 
problem is that those in powerful positions with regard to knowledge can 
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choose arbitrarily to set ends through which they can change the applica-
tion of the proviso in particular circumstances by pursuing research that 
affects the value of currently available products in the market. Purely by 
their arbitrary choices they can therefore force a reshuffling of private 
property. Again, the granting of such power to knowledgeable persons 
with respect to the ownership of private property for all seems irreconcil-
able with the notion of being equally subjected to laws rather than to par-
ticular persons’ choices or wills. In these cases, one particular group or 
person is seen as having the right to change the way in which the proviso 
is specified and applied in particular circumstances.  
 If I am right in thinking that Simmons’s position runs aground on 
these three problems in the ways described, then it seems that his con-
ception of the proviso faces even bigger challenges with respect to ensur-
ing Lockean freedom than does Nozick’s. Hence, though Simmons is 
more concerned than Nozick with securing for people exclusive property 
rights and self-governance under laws, having knowledge play such an 
important role in the application of the proviso actually serves to under-
mine securing those advances on Nozick’s position. 
 
3.c. Gopal Sreenivasan’s and Michael Otsuka’s accounts of the proviso 
 
Gopal Sreenisvasan and Michael Otsuka reject Nozick’s and Simmons’s 
interpretations of the Lockean proviso since they do not secure everyone 
a right to land.14 Despite the clear advantages attaching to this aspect of 
Sreenivasan’s and Otsuka’s conceptions of the proviso, I will argue that 
their theories suffer even more acutely from the problems arising from 
presuming the latest scientific knowledge when applying the proviso.  
 Sreenivasan argues that if all persons start out with “the largest uni-
versalizable share of land,” then the requirement of the proviso is met. 
The largest universalizable share, Sreenivasan argues, is calculated on 
the basis of the “comfort and support” (welfare) the various pieces of 
land can produce divided by the number of persons who have a right to 
appropriate a fair share of these resources. This calculation is a function 
of all the variables that influence the welfare that can be produced from 
the land, including the best available technology, fertility, and economic 
organization.15  
 Michael Otsuka argues in a similar fashion.16 The main difference 
between Sreenivasan and Otsuka is that Otsuka includes the abilities of 
                                                 
 14Since Michael Otsuka shares this basic assumption with Sreenivasan, I address 
relevant and contrasting aspects of Otsuka’s theory as I go along.  
 15Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property, p. 117, including n. 54. 
 16Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 30 ff. 
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the persons appropriating the land as a relevant variable when calculating 
the welfare potential of the land. This difference entails that the disabled 
obtain a right to more valuable land than the able-bodied. Otsuka then 
argues that if we assume that persons have “normal” tastes, meaning that 
they also want luxuries, then by giving the disabled possession of the 
luxury goods, their rights can be secured through trade. He gives an ex-
ample in which a majority of able-bodied persons and a minority of dis-
abled persons inhabit an island. By giving the disabled persons control 
over the beaches (luxury goods) and the able-bodied the right to the 
farmland, “robust rights to self-ownership” can be secured for both par-
ties. By robust rights to self-ownership, Otsuka means that both the able-
bodied and the disabled can set and pursue ends without being forced to 
labor for others and also without any coercive redistribution, since both 
parties’ rights can be secured through trade (farming products in ex-
change for access to beaches).17  
 Prima facie, these solutions seem preferable to those of Nozick and 
Simmons. Otsuka’s and Sreenivasan’s solutions not only give all persons 
a right to land, but they also tie the correct application of the proviso to 
something it is prima facie easy to measure empirically, namely, the total 
welfare potential of the land divided by the number of persons (with ad-
justments for the disabled, in Otsuka’s theory). Nevertheless, since these 
theories include the strongest appeal to the latest scientific knowledge, 
they are subject to the three problems discussed above even more acutely 
than the others. First, having the welfare potential depend on the best 
available technology, fertility of the soil, the economic organization op-
erative on the land, and people’s individual abilities and normal tastes for 
luxury goods requires that everyone with a right to appropriate land must 
have a right to the updated information relevant to those calculations. But 
as we have seen in the other cases, having such a right conflicts with the 
right to the fruits of one’s labor. Second, since anyone with new knowl-
edge is required to act on it by instigating a reshuffling of the world’s 
resources (at least as it affects her share) and to make her knowledge 
available to everyone else (strongly or weakly construed), she seems to 
have lost the right to set her own ends with her means. 
 Illustrating the third problem, why some individuals will end up sub-
ject to the arbitrary choices of others, requires a bit more of the theories. 
Again, assume that a geologist sets out to find and succeeds in discover-
ing substantial oil reserves on the property of another—a farmer. This 
geological discovery multiplies the welfare that can be produced on the 
                                                 
 17See Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality, pp. 32-34. Controversially, Otsuka 
claims that any additional costs required to secure the rights of disabled persons can come 
through fines charged against criminals for their wrongdoing (pp. 31-53). 
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farmer’s particular piece of land. In contrast to Locke, Sreenivasan’s ac-
count does not entail that everyone has a right to some of the oil. Rather, 
the discovery must be taken into account when recalculating how the 
value of this particular piece of land influences the total welfare potential 
of land each person has a right to appropriate under the proviso. Under 
conditions of scarcity, with each new discovery of a resource, the “uni-
versalizable” share each person has a right to changes. Therefore, after 
the oil is discovered, through no choice of his own, the original land-
owner now has a right only to a very small piece of his former land—a 
piece presumably too small to make a living from farming. The rest of 
his land must be redistributed so as to provide everyone else with her 
recalculated largest universalizable share. Therefore, because the farmer 
does not have enough land left to continue farming, he must either go 
into the oil business or sell his land in order to buy a new tract of land.18 
Hence, Sreenivasan’s account also incurs the third problem of having 
one’s right to set and pursue ends conditioned by the arbitrary choices of 
another. 
 In this particular case, the farmer’s right to his private property and 
the values he has created on his land is seen as conditioned by what an-
other particular person (the geologist) arbitrarily chooses to do with re-
gard to his resources (research abilities). Because the geologist sets out to 
discover oil and actually does, the farmer must discontinue farming on 
his land. Of course, one can object by arguing that the farmer can simply 
sell his new share of land and purchase another tract of farmland. One 
might argue that even though this conception of the proviso entails that 
the farmer will have to start over (by rebuilding the farm on a new piece 
of land) each time a similar scenario occurs, this only shows a consider-
able practical inconvenience related to our rights to private property. On 
the contrary, I believe the objection underestimates the problems illus-
trated by the example. It seems that on this conception of the proviso, 
those who find ways to enhance the welfare potential of particular pieces 
of land are permitted to change the way in which the proviso applies. 
Because the application of the proviso requires the most updated scien-
tific knowledge with regard to natural resources at any time, those with-
out knowledge find their rights to property subject to the choices of those 
with it, rather than subject to laws. In fact, in this example, the geologist 
is permitted to determine, albeit temporarily, which particular means are 
available to the farmer, and thus to force the farmer to begin his farming 
                                                 
 18It may be worth pointing out that the same method for calculating the welfare po-
tential will be used to accommodate the rights of newcomers. For example, as newcomers 
arrive they can be given a piece of oil land that has the welfare potential equivalent to any 
other piece of land. If they have such a piece of land at their disposal, their rights to ap-
propriation under the proviso have been fulfilled. 
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project anew should the geologist decide to pursue his research plans. 
Since particular persons can obtain such power over others with respect 
to private property rights, it seems a stretch to say that the position en-
ables a private sphere delineated by the laws of nature. 
 Similar problems seem to arise for Otsuka. In the well-known island 
example, Otsuka assumes that all the inhabitants arrive at the island at 
the same time. Assume that originally these consist in two able-bodied 
and two physically disabled persons. On Otsuka’s theory, the disabled 
persons get the beaches, whereas the able-bodied persons get the farm-
land. Then assume that the two beach-owners spend much of their time 
doing scientific research. But instead of researching ways to help them-
selves overcome some of the physical challenges that result from their 
disabilities, they research ways to enhance the welfare potential of farm-
land. Perhaps they invent new tools that streamline and therefore in-
crease production. Consequently, to account for the results of their re-
search with respect to the welfare potential of the land, there are reshuf-
flings of land in their favor, say, increased prices for access to the 
beaches. Alternatively, it could have been the farmers who set out to in-
vent the tools that make it possible for the physically disabled to do some 
farming. In either case, it seems that by mere arbitrary choice, the par-
ticipants can change how the proviso is applied—with the consequent 
reshuffling of land.  
 
 
4. An Attempt to Overcome the Problems Regarding the Application 
 of the Proviso 
 
In this final part of the paper, I will try to overcome the three problems I 
have argued face currently available conceptions of the proviso. For con-
siderations of space I will limit my efforts to Sreenivasan’s account and 
to problems issuing from appeals to the latest available technology. It is 
reasonable, however, to argue that if we can reinterpret the notion of 
“available” technological knowledge such that we can calculate the wel-
fare potential of land without invoking the problems above, then revised 
Lockean theories can probably avoid them.  
 One way to reinterpret the technology requirement is to argue that its 
correct application is determined by each person’s actual technical 
knowledge, rather than by the best available technological knowledge, 
and to argue that it is each person’s choice whether or not to act on her 
actual knowledge. Under these assumptions, the three problems seem to 
be avoided. No one obtains a right to anyone else’s knowledge (labor), 
everyone is free to pursue her own ends with her means, and no one ap-
pears able to affect the application of the proviso to particular circum-
stances by mere choice. The fact that some persons have particular or 
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more actual knowledge, or even a new technological insight, that affects 
the maximum welfare potential of a piece of land would no longer neces-
sarily affect the welfare potential calculated under the provisions of the 
proviso.19 For example, the farmer in our example above can keep farm-
ing on the land even if the geologist discovers oil on the land, since the 
farmer does not have this knowledge. Knowledgeable persons also have 
sole discretion over whether or not they use their knowledge in relation 
to their fair share, though if they do want to use their knowledge, then 
their share of natural resources will be appropriately reduced. In our ex-
ample above, if the farmer actually has the knowledge required and 
wants to use it to extract the oil from the ground, then his share should be 
appropriately reduced—otherwise not. Hence, we might think that under 
this conception of the proviso, Lockean freedom is intact. 
 An immediate problem now surfaces, however, in that most individu-
als cannot calculate their fair share of the resources, since they neither 
have nor can obtain the technological knowledge such a calculation re-
quires. To calculate one’s relative rightful proportion of land relative to 
everyone else’s at all times, a person must have knowledge equal to every-
one else, given that people actually want to use their knowledge. Hence, 
it seems that what progress we made with the new interpretation of the 
technology requirement (from best available to actual knowledge) is 
erased, since we have ended up with a conception according to which 
people can be subjected to restrictions whose correctness they cannot in 
principle evaluate. Since people do not have the right to the knowledge 
that justifies the restrictions applied, our theory has left them deprived of 
the possibility of knowing rightful from wrongful private property ap-
propriations. To avoid this, we must argue that everyone has the right to 
all required technological knowledge and those with the knowledge must 
at the very least make it available, which reintroduces problems one 
(equal right to the fruits of one’s labor) and two (freedom to set and pur-
sue one’s own ends).20 The proposal also fails to make any progress with 
                                                 
 19It seems necessary to argue that those who happen to have knowledge only with 
regard to a particular kind of land that they do not themselves possess cannot be required 
to give up some of their own land, since they cannot utilize this knowledge. Similarly, they 
also do not get an automatic right to particular types of land simply because they have 
knowledge suitable to producing a great amount of welfare on the land. Only in this way 
can we avoid the problem of some persons’ new knowledge leading to a reshuffling of land.  
 20We might be tempted to respond to this objection by saying that rather than gaining 
the new knowledge himself, the ignorant person can appoint someone to calculate his fair 
share and thereby exercise his rights on his behalf. But this choice appears irrational in 
that it is an incoherent way for the ignorant person to exercise his rights. Exercising one’s 
rights merely by authorizing another to do so for him is incoherent, because it involves a 
regress of authorizations. The ignorant person, due to his lack of knowledge, has no way 
of determining whether the person he appoints is exercising his rights correctly, either by 
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regard to the third problem, since it seems that everyone is even further 
subjected to the arbitrary choices of knowledgeable persons. It seems not 
only that the rightful shares change each time people change their minds 
regarding whether or not to employ their knowledge to increase the wel-
fare potential of their land, but the relative shares would change each 
time a person moves from inefficient to efficient uses of her land—and 
vice versa. This interpretation of the technology requirement implies that 
a person’s fair share is subject to knowledgeable persons’ changing opin-
ions and even whimsical decisions concerning what they want to do with 
their land. Rather than enabling free interaction under laws, the proposed 
interpretation leaves everyone subject to the arbitrary wills of those with 
knowledge when it comes to the proviso’s application.21 
 At this point, we may be tempted to resolve this problem by alleviat-
ing the need to reshuffle property in response to persons’ varying degrees 
of new knowledge and decisions concerning how or whether to employ 
that knowledge. We could simply adopt the view that changes in knowl-
edge do not give rise to a requirement to redistribute shares. Conse-
quently, fair shares are calculated on the basis of the actual technical 
knowledge existing “at the beginning” or at the time of the first appro-
priation of fair shares. From then onward, new knowledge has no rele-
vance to later calculations. Unfortunately, however, it is very problem-
atic to disallow that new knowledge can initiate redistribution. On the 
one hand, we encounter a new type of problem, namely, one related to 
luck and power. The amount of natural resources one has a right to 
would now be largely dependent on luck—on whether future discoveries 
will enhance the welfare potential of the natural resources one has. Since 
such later discoveries do not trigger redistribution, it is merely a matter 
of chance who ends up with the better “fair” share as knowledge in-
creases. Moreover, even in the scenario where only a few end up with the 
vast amount of the really valuable resources and so with much more eco-
                                                                                                             
calculating his fair share correctly or by acting in his real interests. The only solution 
seems to require the ignorant person to appoint a second person to monitor the actions of 
the first. But this of course requires him to authorize a third person to monitor the actions 
of the second, and so on. Therefore, this option presents an irrational choice, because it 
does not present a coherent way in which one exercises one’s natural rights. 
 21It seems worth pointing out that this conception of the proviso also appears impos-
sible to realize. To see this, imagine that many of the existing landowners have already 
switched into high-technology industries and therefore have little land at their disposal. 
Also assume that some newcomers arrive who have little knowledge and hence must be 
given a right to fairly substantial pieces of land. For considerations of space, it seems ap-
propriate simply to say that reflecting upon this problem seems to lead to the conclusion not 
only that any attempt at solving this problem seems to reproduce the three problems consid-
ered throughout this paper, but it does not seem possible to conceive of this solution in such 
a way that it is reconcilable with everybody’s right to be equal under the laws of nature. 
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nomic power, this does not, in itself, give rise to problems of justice. 
 On the other hand, our three original problems also arise with this 
proposal, although in a slightly different form. Natural scientists are no 
longer the ones advantaged or disadvantaged. Rather, historians will play 
the pivotal role in the application of the proviso. Historians must employ 
their knowledge to figure out the status of technological knowledge “at 
the beginning” in order to fairly calculate the fair shares, and they must 
share their research and possibly educate others as to how correctly to 
apply the proviso. It might be tempting to argue that significant progress 
is made with respect to the third problem, that one person’s research 
choices can arbitrarily determine what constitutes a fair share of the natu-
ral resources, since scientific discoveries can no longer initiate a reshuf-
fling of current property distributions. But this is true only if there are no 
research discoveries in history, which is highly unlikely. Rather, it seems 
that if an historian sets out to challenge the “established” truth concern-
ing what was known about a particular natural resource at the beginning 
of fair share appropriation, then her arbitrary choice of which research 
project to pursue would indeed determine the application of the proviso.  
 Certainly, it is possible to offer additional interpretations of the tech-
nology requirement. Hence, though the arguments given in this section 
do not together provide a conclusive refutation of contemporary Lockean 
conceptions of the proviso, I do believe they justify my claim that con-
temporary positions have yet to provide a conception of the application 
of the proviso that is consistent with their notion of Lockean freedom. 
On all the interpretations I have considered, the aim of the proviso is in-
consistent with any reasonable application of it, because in each applica-
tion it contradicts its very aim, namely, to enable free interaction as 
equals under laws rather than subjection to some particular person’s will. 
Moreover, my suspicion is that any appeal to knowledge regarding the 
application will encounter the problems I have identified in some way or 
another. Since knowledge changes as a result of people’s labor, it seems 
impossible to arrive at a stable conception of private property understood 
in terms of labor subject to the proviso. That is to say, Lockean freedom 
requires a conception of people freely setting and pursuing their own 
ends with their means as equals under law. Labor subject to the proviso 
aims to identify what their means are in the first place. Yet because 
knowledge is required to apply the proviso and since labor advances 
knowledge, the proviso cannot provide a stable restriction within which 
labor functions. Labor changes how the proviso is applied, and particular 
individuals choose what to invest their labor in. Consequently, the pro-
viso cannot function as a restriction that enables freedom and equality 
under law rather than subjection to arbitrary choices.  
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5. Concluding Remarks  
 
Sreenivasan emphasizes that the proviso is meant as a sufficient, and not 
a necessary, requirement.22 This may reasonably be interpreted as mean-
ing that insofar as it is empirically the case that all persons start out with 
the largest universalizable share, then the proviso is satisfied. We can see 
Sreenivasan as sharing this feature of his account with Locke, Nozick, 
and Simmons. Perhaps this is what Locke meant when he said that we 
satisfy the proviso “at least if” we leave enough and as good behind, be-
cause in so doing we do no “prejudice” to others when we appropriate. 
So if we interpret all the proposals for the proviso as a sufficient condi-
tion, then the proviso is seen as met if all persons as a matter of fact do 
enjoy a piece of land as required by it. Thus, we need not pay attention to 
how it came about that people determined their fair shares. 
 I disagree with this claim. The problems identified arise as the result 
of the proviso’s application in the empirical world, and in that world our 
current knowledge grows by means of particular persons’ labor. More-
over, the crucial point is that the proviso is the solution to Locke’s origi-
nal puzzle about private property: it is supposed to be an enforceable 
principle that enables an individual unilaterally to appropriate private 
property from the commons in a way reconcilable with the Lockean no-
tion of lawful freedom. And only if everyone can actually apply and en-
force the proviso is it reconcilable with Locke’s claim that everyone has 
a natural executive right or a natural right to enforce the laws of nature. 
Hence, even if it happens to be the case that the proviso is fulfilled—say, 
because everyone happens to agree on how to fulfill it—Locke’s original 
puzzle concerning private property would remain unsolved, since we 
have failed to explain an enforceable natural right to appropriate private 
property from the commons.23 
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 22Sreenivasan, The Limits of Lockean Rights in Property, p. 115. 
 23Thanks to Arnt Myrstad, Arthur Ripstein, Sergio Tenenbaum, Gopal Sreenivasan, and 
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